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THE JURISPRUDENCE OF AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION: A POST-REALIST ANALYSIS
JAN G. DEUTSCH*
In this essay, Professor Deutsch explains why the Realists'
description of our legal system is invalid and then proposes a
post-Realist explanation of it. Using the example of affirmative
action, he attempts to demonstrate both why society accepts
desegregation decrees and whyjudges often reject racial quotas
although such quotas may be the most efficient means of
remedying past discrimination.
I
In a civil law jurisdiction, one is presumed to be able adequately to
define the law by pointing to the volume containing the relevant
statutory provisions. The emphasis on process that represents the
permanent contribution of the work of Henry Hart brings into
prominence the fact that the common law concept of precedent
incorporates this act of pointing. What is perhaps most remarkable
about this incorporation is the self-definitional aspect that makes it
possible to assert that the law is completely defined by what the courts
say it is. In practical terms, what makes this incorporation feasible is
that the value of any system consists of its application to particular
instances; what precedents mean are the propositions for which they
are cited by future courts.'
To understand our post-Realist era in legal history, it seems
appropriate to engage in the act of oversimplification required by any
attempt to account for a shift in intellectual perspective. For the
Realists, precedent does not actually define the law, but rather serves
*Professor of Law, Yale University; A.B. 1955, LL.B. 1962, Ph.D. 1962, Yale University.
1. R. POUND, THE FoimIvE ERA OF AmERICAN LAw 112 (1938) ("Until the world stands still
and life ceases to involve activity and change, every code and every corpus juris will be subject to
alteration and interpretation and revision.")
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as a justification for a decision rooted in the values of the particular
judge;2 it merely gives the appearance of harmony and continuity as the
judge applies his biases and sympathies to a given situation.3 Although
recognizing that it is through an oversimplification, I nonetheless will
try to demonstrate that the Realists failed to create a satisfactory legal
theory because of a naive overestimation of the clarity with which truth
about what law is can be communicated. What I am attempting, in
short, is to demonstrate the explanatory power of the metaphor.
The general jurisprudential question I will attempt to answer is why
the common law is effective: why this nation-and even a separate and
equal branch-continues to obey judges possessing power "over
Neither the sword Nor the purse."5 Because the common law is a
system that works through application of precedent to facts and facts to
precedent, the focus will be upon a particular concrete situation, and
the example of affirmative action is particularly enlightening.
The Realist postulates a judge subjectively perceiving a goal, who
then acts to achieve that goal in the most efficient manner available.
Yet even courts who have accepted the need for affirmative action in
implementing desegregation decrees often have resisted the most
efficient means to that end,6 the imposition of racial quotas. Thus-
and this is what the post-Realist has come to recognize-the judge's
perception of the goal and of the available means is tempered by the
role imposed on him both personally and institutionally, that of serving
as a filter for the values of society. What causes the judge to implement
something other than his own individual biases and sympathies is not
2. G. WrE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION 274 (1976).
3. Id.
4. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974) (legitimate needs ofjudicial process
may outweigh generalized assertion of executive privilege as to confidential communications).
5. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 504 (A. Hamilton) (Bicentennial ed., R. Luce, Inc. publisher
1976).
6. The argument assumes that racial quotas would be the most efficient means of attaining
desegregation. If one defines desegregation as access to resources by the disadvantaged group
equivalent to that previously afforded the advantaged group, the assumption seems justified.
7. E.g., Kirkland v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Servs., 520 F.2d 420, 428-30 (2d
Cir.) (district court improperly imposed racial quota on state civil service eligibility list, but other
relief affirmed; clear-cut, long-term, egregious discrimination absent and effect of discrimination
on small, identifiable group otherwise remediable), rehearing en banc denied, 531 F.2d 5 (2d Cir.
1975); Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 415 F. Supp. 761,768 (E.D. La. 1976) (courts
are reluctantto impose racial quotas because inequitable); BridgeportEduc. Ass'n v. Zinner, 416
F. Supp. 715,723-24 (D. Conn. 1976) (unsettled whether court may order racial preference after
finding prior discrimination); cf. United Jewish Orgs., Inc. v. Carey, 45 U.S.L.W. 4221, 4231-33
(U.S. Mar. 1, 1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("strict quota" approach by state to redistricting
under Voting Rights Act not consonant with earlier Supreme Court decisions; "racial gerry-
mandering" improper even if purpose is to aid blacks); De Funis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312,336
(1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("no constitutional right for any race to be preferred"); Bakke v.
880 [Vol. 65:879
HeinOnline -- 65 Geo. L. J. 924 1976-1977
1977] JURISPRUDENCE 881
the dead hand of precedent, but the living force of others' values. The
strength of our common law is thus that it can reconcile contradictions
by embracing the social goals in whose service the Realists wished to
enlist the law, while simultaneously guarding against implementation
of individual biases and sympathies by, if necessary, rejecting the most
efficient means of implementing those goals.
The Realist school of thought was a product of an era in which Social
Darwinism largely accomplished in its sphere what Newton was
regarded as having accomplished in the physical realm-the replace-
ment of the judgmental morality of religious injunctions with appar-
ently scientific descriptions of mechanisms. As a result, the Realists
could ignore the distinction between the scientific law, which defines
what must be if certain conditions are satisfied, and the moral law,
which defines what ought to be." Law made by judges is in fact a
description of how members of society want each other to behave; each
person wants to impose his own values, but he also wants every other
person not to impose his own on him. Thus, by ignoring the distinction
between law as a must and law as an ought, the Realists failed to
recognize that law's essentially contradictory nature accurately mir-
rors the tragic condition of human existence.
II
The essence of the human tragedy-in fact, what defines the human
condition-is the consciousness of mortality. In social terms, it was to
the repression of this consciousness that Freud traced cultural
Regents of the Univ., 18 Cal. 3d 34,55,553 P.2d 1152,1166,132 Cal. Rptr. 680,694 (1976) (no
ameliorative measures may be related to race), cert. granted, 45 U.S.L.W. 3570 (U.S. Feb. 22,
1977) (No. 76-811). "The permissible scope of the use of quotas as a remedy in discrimination
cases remains a delicate question." United States v. New Hampshire, 539 F.2d 277,280 n.4 (1st
Cir. 1976). Some Supreme Court decisions do imply that quotas may be an appropriate remedy,
but the Court has not yet faced the issue squarely. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd.
of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 25 (1971); United States v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 395 U.S. 225,
236 (1969). In United Jewish Organizations, Inc. v. Carey the Court found that compliance with
section 5 of the Voting Rights Act often requires the use of racial considerations in redistricting.
45 U.S.L.W. 4221, 4225 (U.S. Mar. 1, 1977). The plurality opinion concluded that, although the
state "used race in a purposeful manner," neither the fourteenth nor fifteenth amendment was
infringed because whites were not "under-represented relative to their share of the population."
Id. at 4227.
8. This is one example of the oversimplification to which I previously referred. Of course, not all
Realists ignored the "ought," but all did focus on the "is." Compare Pound, The CallforaRealist
Jurisprudence, 44 HARv.L. REv. 697, 697 (1931) (work of Realists is not concerned with questions
of what ought to be) with Llewellyn, SomeRealismAboutRealism-Responding to DeanPound, 44
HAnV. L. REv. 1222, 1262 (1931) (survey of Realist literature shows Pound wrong). Dealing with
the "is" was the Realists' great contribution.
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expression in Civilization and Its Discontents.9 On a personal level, the
individual defines himself as a human being by maintaining awareness
of the similarity between himself and others while sustaining those
differences that define his own individuality. In personal terms,
therefore, what is repressed is the fact of individual mortality that is the
ultimate human similarity. The most common manifestation of this
repression is the individual's need to reproduce himself. Children,
however, are not the only symbolic form of immortality. Group
membership-identification as a member of a group that survives
individual deaths-also fulfills this need.
The pursuit of legitimacy by political authority-the justification for
coercion of the individual in furtherance of supraindividual goals-is
unending because of the permanent tension between the two aspects of
the individual's definition of himself as human. Whatever status an
individual accepts by identifying himself as a member of the group may,
over time, conflict with a desire to discard that identification, to
express individual values free of the obligations of group membership,
or to assume membership in a different group. In a large and diverse
society, the resolution of such conflicts may well require choices by the
individual as to which memberships are preferred; it may also require
the individual to subjugate some individual values to the values of the
group, to express those conflicting individual values in a manner
acceptable to the group, or to obscure his belief in those conflicting
values.1" These resolutions may occur consciously, as expressions of a
strong belief in how the system should operate or in what is most
expedient in the particular situation, or unconsciously, because group
dynamics influence individual values.
I
According to the analysis adumbrated above, the decision in Dred
Scott"l represents an attempt by the Justices of the Supreme Court to
avoid resolving such a conflict between the individual and the groups of
which he is a potential member by defining the individual plaintiff as
belonging to a group existing outside the political community defined
by the Constitution. The Court described its duty as deciding "whether
the facts stated in the plea are sufficient to show that the plaintiff is not
entitled to sue as a citizen in a court of the United States":12
9. S. FREUD, CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 69-75 (J. Riviere trans. 1958).
10. See generally L. FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DIssONANCE (1957).
11. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
12. Id. at 402.
882 [Vol. 65:879
HeinOnline -- 65 Geo. L. J. 926 1976-1977
JURISPRUDENCE
The question is simply this: Can a negro, whose ancestors
were imported into this country, and sold as slaves, become a
member of the political community formed and brought into
existence by the Constitution of the United States .... 13
In the opinion of the court, the legislation and histories of
the times, and the language used in the Declaration of
Independence, show that neither the class of persons who
had been imported as slaves, nor their descendants, whether
they had become free or not, were then acknowledged as a
part of the people, nor intended to be included in the general
words used in that memorable instrument. 4
Yet the men who framed this declaration were great
men-high in literary acquirements-high in their sense of
honor, and incapable of asserting principles inconsistent
with those on which they were acting. They perfectly
understood the meaning of the language they used, and how
it would be understood by others; and they knew
that it would not in any part of the civilized world be
supposed to embrace the negro race, which, by common
consent, had been excluded from civilized Governments and
the family of nations, and doomed to slavery. They spoke and
acted according to the then established doctrines and
principles, and in the ordinary language of the day, and no
one misunderstood them. The unhappy black race were
separated from the white by indelible marks, and laws long
before established, and were never thought of or spoken of
except as property, and when the claims of the owner or the
profit of the trader were supposed to need protection. 15
The powers over person and property of which we speak
are not only not granted to Congress, but are in express terms
denied, and they are forbidden to exercise them. . . . And if
Congress itself cannot do this-if it is beyond the powers
conferred on the Federal Government-it will be admitted,
we presume, that it could not authorize a territorial
Government to exercise them. It could confer no power on
13. Id. at 403.
14. Id. at 407.
15. Id. at 410.
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any local Government, established by its authority, to violate
the provisions of the Constitution.
It seems, however, to be supposed, that there is a
difference between property in a slave and other property,
and that different rules may be applied to it in expounding
the Constitution of the United States. And the laws and
usages of nations, and the writings of eminent jurists upon
the relation of master and slave and their mutual rights and
duties, and the powers which Governments may exercise
over it, have been dwelt upon in the argument.
But in considering the question before us, it must be borne
in mind that there is no law of nations standing between the
people of the United States and their Government, and
interfering with their relation to each other. . . . And if the
Constitution recognises the right of property of the master in
a slave, and makes no distinction between that description of
property and other property owned by a citizen, no tribunal,
acting under the authority of the United States, whether it be
legislative, executive, or judicial, has a right to draw such a
distinction, or deny to it the benefit of the provisions and
guarantees which have been provided for the protection of
private property against the encroachments of the
Government."16
As the last argument indicates, the strategy employed by the
Supreme Court to avoid holding that blacks existed within the
American social and constitutional communities required acceptance
of the proposition either that the community governed by the Constitu-
tion of the United States is not subject to the law of nations or that
persons treated as property are not participants in the human
condition. If the latter proposition is accepted, then, insofar as
economics can be regarded as a science, the only law is that which
defines what is thought inevitable under certain social conditions
rather than what ought to be undertaken in accordance with given
social aspirations.
IV
Law in the latter sense, what ought to be, governed the implementa-
tion of the equal protection clause undertaken by the Supreme Court in
Brown v. Board of Education.1 7 Herbert Wechsler's jurisprudential
16. Id. at 450-51.
17. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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objection to Brown, although phrased in terms of lack of neutrality,
intimated that the Supreme Court was engaged in the process of
politics rather than lawmaking.18 Wechsler analyzes Brown:
The Court did not declare . . that the fourteenth
amendment forbids all racial lines in legislation .... 19
... Rather, it seems to me, [the decision] must have rested
on the view that racial segregation is, in principle, a denial of
equality to the minority against whom it is directed; that is,
the group thatis not dominant politically and, therefore, does
not make the choice involved.0
For me, [however], assuming equal facilities, the question
posed by state-enforced segregation is not one of discrimina-
tion at all. Its human and its constitutional dimensions lie
entirely elsewhere, in the denial by the state of freedom to
associate, a denial that impinges in the same way on any
groups or races that may be involved.2 '
Brown is more appropriately perceived as a legal response to Dred
Scott. Given my reading of Dred Scott, it was, of course, simply not the
case that "denial by the state of freedom to associate" impinged on the
plaintiffs-in Brown "in the same way [as] on any groups or races";
-Wechsler's analysis is valid only ifBrown is read as a recognition, on the
part of the Supreme Court, that the descendants of slaves are members
of the political community governed by the Constitution of the United
States. The individual Justices considered blacks to be members of the
political community, and thus faced a dilemma: the yearnings of blacks
to be treated no differently than other members of the community
conflicted with the values of many whites. The Justices phrased the
decision as if they had no choice. In fact, the real controversy arose
after the Court decided on the remedy, 22 and even the remedy was
tempered to placate, unsuccessfully, the views of others.23 The ques-
tion remains, however, why the defendants inBrown were bound by the
18. See Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1(1959)
[hereinafter cited as Neutral Principles].
19. Id. at 32.
20. Id. at 33.
21. Id. at 34.
22. See R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 711 (1976) (until the implementing decree was handed
down, extremists had nothing firm to attack).
23. Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown 11), 349 U.S. 294, 299-301 (1955). See also Greenberg,
The Supreme Cour4 Civil Rights and Civil Dissonance,77 YALE L.J. 1520, 1522-28 (1968)
(desegregation hampered until late 1960's by political and social factors).
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decree issued by the Supreme Court and why the law enunciated in that
decision should have been obeyed.
V
Wechsler himself noted that in our society the resolution of conflicts
among competing groups crucially involves the institutional structure
of federalism:
In a far flung, free society, the federalist values are enduring.
They call upon a people to achieve a unity sufficient to resist
their common perils and advance their common welfare,
without undue sacrifice of their diversities and the creative
energies to which diversity gives rise. They call for gov-
ernment responsive to the will of the full national con-
stituency, without loss of responsiveness to lesser voices,
reflecting smaller bodies of opinion, in areas that constitute
their own legitimate concern. 24
One legal implementation of these values of federalism occurs by
means of choice of law, by requiring that certain conditions be met
before disputes are governed by federal rather than state law or by the
law of a state other than that in which the court sits. Judicial decisions
concerning those conditions, opinions in the field of conflict of laws, are
those most apt to be characterized by the layman as purely technical,
and that characterization is proper because the impact of such
decisions on the resolution of the controversy before the court is
apparent only to the lawyer.
However, such technical knowledge-expertise in assessing the
significance of the subtle changes in the way a system of rules is
applied-represents the source of professional power not only for
lawyers, but also for politicians. Empirical findings indicate that
"although Americans almost unanimously agree on a number of
general propositions about democracy, they disagree about specific
applications to crucial cases" and that "a majority of voters frequently
hold views contrary to the rules of the game actually followed in the
political system."25 Those rules, however, will remain in force in the
absence of agreement by the majority as to the desirability of a single
set of alternatives, because those who devote substantial amounts of
time to political activity tend, because they have mastered the existing
24. Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition
and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. R .v. 543, 543 (1954). Thus, federalism
itself provides a metaphor for the individual in the dual roles of individual and group member.
25. R. DAHL, WHO GOVERNS? DEMOCRACY AND POWER IN AN AmECAN Crry 312 (1961)
(footnotes omitted).
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rules, to resist changes in them. Moreover, agreement on the desir-
ability of a single set of alternatives is unlikely so long as voters who do
not devote substantial amounts of time to politics continue to focus
only on changes in substantive rather than technical rules.
VI
Wechsler began his Holmes lecture, "Toward Neutral Principles of
Constitutional Law," by responding to Learned Hand's argument
denying legitimacy to the power of judicial review exercised by the
Supreme Court of the United States.2 6 Wechsler's argument centered
on the supremacy clause,27 which he interpreted "as a mandate to all of
officialdom including courts, with a special and emphatic admonition
that it binds the judges of the previous independent states. ' 28 In terms
of the meaning of Brown, it seems important that the very decision cited
as establishing the power of judicial review-Marbury v.
Madison29 -involved a similar focus on technical as opposed to
substantive rules. The Court established the judicial power to define
and resolve conflicts among laws and the Constitution in a decision that
denied to the Congress the power to grant to the Supreme Court of the
United States the right to issue the writ of mandamus. 0 The real
decision in Brown could not be hidden in technicalities, however, as the
reaction to the decision showed.
In an opinion signed by all nine Justices, the Supreme Court in
Cooper v. Aaron31 invalidated "actions by the Governor and Legislature
of Arkansas [taken] upon the premise that they are not bound by our
holding in Brown v. Board of Education."32 Although the Court found
that "Itihe controlling legal principles are plain"33 and "enough to
dispose of the case, 34 it also felt it important to "answer the premise of
the actions of the Governor and Legislature that they are not bound by
our holding in the Brown case, ' 3" which it did by "recall[ing] some basic
constitutional propositions which are settled doctrine': 3
26. Neutral Principles, supra note 18, at 2-10.
27. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
28. Neutral Principles, supra note 18, at 3.
29. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
30. Id. at 171-79.
31. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
32. Id. at 4.
33. Id. at 16.
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Article VI of the Constitution makes the Constitution the
"supreme Law of the Land." In 1803, Chief Justice Marshall,
speaking for a unanimous Court, referring to the Constitution
as "the fundamental and paramount law of the nation,"
declared in the notable case of Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch
137, 177, that "It is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is." This decision
declared the basic principle that the federal judiciary is
supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution, and
that principle has ever since been respected by this Court
and the Country as a permanent and indispensable feature of
our constitutional system. It follows that the interpretation of
the Fourteenth Amendment enunciated by this Court in the
Brown case is the supreme law of the land, and Art. VI of the
Constitution makes it of binding effect on the States "any
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding."37
The Supreme Court wished to make it clear that the system operates
only if everyone adheres, perhaps grudgingly, to its decisions. What
was left unstated is the corollary: the system works only if judges, in
reaching decisions, attempt in good faith to reconcile the conflicting
values in the community.
Judicial implementation of affirmative action programs seeks to
fulfill the promise of Brownby accomplishing two goals simultaneously:
compensating for past injustices and providing equality of access to the
resources required to realize future opportunities.38 Yet racial quotas
are unpopular with many whites: "Governmentally-imposed pref-
erential treatment may, in the eyes of whites, be so improper that it will
have negative effects on an entire range of shared values which
reinforce the economic, political, and social infrastructure."39 More
generally, furthermore, the courts are faced both by a diversity of
rapidly changing environments in which past discrimination has
produced deprivations and the fact that reparations for such past
discrimination would not necessarily provide equal opportunity for
future advancement in any such environment. As a result, any given
37. Id. at 18.
38. Comment, Race Quotas, 8 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 128, 151-55 (1973).
39. Id. at 167; accord, United Jewish Orgs., Inc. v. Carey, 45 U.S.L.W. 4221,4229 (U.S. Mar. 1,
1977) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("we cannot well ignore the social reality that even a benign policy
of assignment by race is viewed as unjust by many in our society, especially by those individuals
who are adversely affected by a given classification").But see Abernathy, Book Review, 65 GEO.
L.J. 181, 186 (1976) (popular dissatisfaction with race-conscious relief is not rejection of all
efforts to aid blacks as much as itis suspicion that many such efforts are arbitrary or unnecessary).
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decree may be incapable of functioning as a precedent either for a
different environment or even for future plaintiffs in the same
environment. Given this situation, the jurisprudential question pre-
sented is what gives such decrees the force of law: why should any
given environment be changed in accordance with what the individual
judge has decided the law requires?
The most concise formulation of the answer is that our system makes
judges capable of deciding in accordance with Kant's Categorical
Imperative: "[A]ct on that maxim through which you can at the same
time will that it should become a universal law,"4 and "in such a way
that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the
person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same
time as an end." 41 Because the judge is not in fact personally bound by
the decree being issued, my argument is purely formal in that it simply
assumes what it is attempting to demonstrate-the good faith of the
judge. I will attempt to demonstrate further, however, that for human
society the assumption that the institution of law permits us to know
when decrees are issued in good faith is a necessary one if we are to
"know" anything in a social context.
Because each individual's consciousness represents a point of view,
each individual perceives and makes choices from that point of view.
To the extent that other points of view can be communicated and taken
into account in making such choices, the necessary adjustments may
successfully be made. We cannot be certain, however, that any given
individual is capable of successfully making all necessary adjustments.
What the law provides is a process, by entry into which a member of
society can compel an adjustment to a personal choice of what is
experienced as conflicting choices by other individuals or groups. Entry
into the process is possible, however, only in terms of the technical rules
of the law. The law, in other words, categorically decides which
ostensibly conflicting points of view have a right to demand mutual
adjustment. Any judicial decree properly can be questioned, of course,
in terms of its adherence to "propositions which are settled doctrine,"
42
but only the reliance on technical rules of law43 makes possible the
40. I.KANT, GROUNDWORK OFTHE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS84 (AK421) (H. Paton trans. 1967).
41. Id. at 91 (AK 429).
42. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 17 (1958).
43. Perhaps this explains why courts sometimes dispose of cases on threshold, technical
grounds of justiciability or the like, although logic indicates that the merits should have been
reached. See Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term-Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L.
REV. 40, 45 (1961) (discussing Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911)).
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hypothesis of successful adjustments of potentially conflicting indi-
vidual consciousnesses.
VII
What I hope has been accomplished thus far is a satisfactory analysis
of the jurisprudence of affirmative action: an explanation of why the
plaintiffs in Brown are no longer entitled to treatment different from
that accorded to "any [other] groups or rAces"" and why individual
judges implementing the resolution of the cases before them in terms
that may not be applicable to later plaintiffs or different social
situations should be obeyed. It remains only to delineate the metaphor
that accounts for the adherence to those decrees, the compulsion on the
individual defendant to prefer the determination reached by the
individual judge over that mix of preferences representing the group
identifications that serve to define his own individual personality.
Physical science observes that free protons and neutrons weigh
slightly more than they do when they are inside an atomic nucleus.
Relativity theory postulates that the loss of weight is the result
of matter having been turned into energy equivalent to the strength of
the forces that bind the nucleus. Measurements of the binding energies
of all known elements show that, from the lightest elements upward,
binding energies generally grow stronger and stronger until they reach a
peak, whereafter, as the elements increase in atomic number, thebind-
ing energies very gradually become weaker. The resultant graph has
become known as the curve of binding energy.
44. Neutral Principles, supra note 18, at 34.
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